We evaluate the efficiency of capital deployment for acquiring firms before mergers and acquisitions (M&As), defined as the return on invested capital net of the cost of capital, and link this measure to firms' postacquisition performance. Acquirers with higher preacquisition net returns on investment have superior long-run operating and stock performance than do acquirers with lower returns. Acquirers with low net returns on investment also underperform matching nonacquirers. The relationship between preacquisition investment return and postacquisition performance is weakened when chief executive officer turnover occurs after deal completion. These results imply that managerial ability in deploying capital and creating value for shareholders persists through M&As.
Introduction
Large-scale mergers and acquisitions (M&As) require substantial capital. While good M&As lead to growth and value creation, bad M&As generate massive losses for acquiring firms' shareholders (e.g., Moeller et al. 2005 ). An extensive strand of literature focuses on the valuation of acquirers at the time of the M&A transaction and establishes the links among valuation, the characteristics of M&A deals, and the performance of merged firms. 1 However, prior literature generally takes valuation as given without examining acquirers' performance in creating value for their shareholders leading up to the M&As.
In this paper, we develop a new measure on acquiring firms' investment efficiency prior to the announcement of M&A deals, and we link this ex ante measure to postmerger performance. Our study can therefore reveal whether the recognition of capital deployment efficiency is a source of market (mis)valuation. To evaluate an acquiring firm's efficiency in capital deployment, we use the net return on invested capital (ROIC), which is defined as the return on capital raised from equity holders and debtholders, in excess of the weighted average cost of capital (WACC).
We hypothesize that managerial ability in deploying capital to productive projects and creating value for shareholders persists. Acquirers with higher net returns on investment prior to the acquisitions are expected to continue to deliver superior returns to their shareholders in the upcoming M&A transaction, whereas acquirers with lower returns on investment are likely to repeat subpar performance.
We conduct three sets of tests to examine our main hypothesis. First, we examine whether the net return on investment of an acquiring firm, constructed before the M&A deal announcement date, can predict the firm's postacquisition operating and stock performance. A positive link, especially the "predictability" of the ex ante investment efficiency on postacquisition stock returns, would provide support for our hypothesis that managerial ability in deploying capital persists. It would also imply that investors and the market do not fully recognize how efficiently acquirers have been in utilizing capital before the M&A deal. Second, we examine whether the M&A deal itself affects postacquisition performance by comparing acquirers with matching nonacquirers. This set of tests can reveal whether completing a large M&A deal can magnify an acquirer's investment deficiency. Third, since our general hypothesis is related to the characteristics of management, we study the effects of CEO turnover on the link between preacquisition investment efficiency and postacquisition performance. We hypothesize that when the CEO-arguably the most important agentleaves the acquiring firm following the M&A deal completion, the link between preacquisition net return on investment and postacquisition performance should be weakened. 2 Management Science, Articles in Advance, pp. 1-17, © 2017 INFORMS Our sample includes more than 3,500 completed M&A deals announced during the period of 1980-2013. The dependent variables in our empirical tests are (a) the merged firm's announcement period abnormal returns, (b) the merged firm's long-run abnormal buyand-hold stock returns (BHARs), and (c) the postacquisition return on assets (ROA). The key explanatory variable in the regression models is the net returns on invested capital, ROIC − WACC, constructed at the fiscal year-end before the M&A deal announcement date.
Our empirical tests yield three sets of results. First, we find that the announcement period returns of acquirers with high net returns on investment are not significantly different from those with low returns. This result suggests that, at the M&A deal announcement, the market does not distinguish acquirers with different levels of investment efficiency. Preacquisition net returns on investment, however, strongly predict the stock returns and the operating performance of postmerger firms during the first three years after the deal completion date. For example, as the net return on investment increases by one standard deviation (11%), the acquirer's buy-and-hold abnormal return during the first year postacquisition increases by 6.3% (the sample average return for the year is −1.1%); its ROA during the same year rises by 4.4%-given the sample mean of 6.9% during the same year, the effect is economically significant. Using calendar-time portfolios, we find that a strategy of long high investment return acquirers and short low investment return acquirers generates a return of 16% during the first year postacquisition.
Second, relative to matching nonacquirers, low efficiency acquirers perform worse, in terms of both longrun abnormal stock returns and ROA, after the completion of the M&A deal. The fact that undertaking M&A deals affects acquirers' postacquisition performance rejects the alternative hypothesis that the predictability of preacquisition investment efficiency is driven by the persistence of certain firm characteristics (e.g., profitability). Finally, in our tests studying the effects of CEO turnover on postacquisition performance, we include a standard set of corporate governance measures as controls. We find that when there is CEO turnover in either the first or second fiscal year after deal completion, the link between the ex ante investment return and the ex post acquirer performance is weakened. These results therefore support the hypothesis that our investment measure depicts managerial effectiveness in deploying capital, of which the CEO is an integral part.
Taken together, our results confirm the validity of our investment return measure in assessing management efficiency prior to M&A deals, and they imply that investors and the market do not fully understand how acquirers have differed in their capacity to generate returns to investment (net of the cost of capital) before the announcement of M&A deals. For practical purposes, our measure of investment efficiency can be used by the board of directors and shareholders of acquiring firms to make prudent decisions before approving large-scale M&A deals. This measure can also be used to investigate management effectiveness in other corporate events, such as seasoned equity offerings (SEOs).
Prior work (e.g., Ang and Cheng 2003 , Rhodes-Kropf et al. 2005 , Dong et al. 2006 ) has examined misvaluations of merging firms at the time of the M&A deal and their impact on subsequent performance. Bouwman et al. (2009) find that postmerger operating performance is negatively related to the valuation level of the market, in that merged firms perform worse during high valuation periods. Our paper builds on this line of research and explores possible channels of misvaluations of acquiring firms. Our results suggest that investors' failure in fully recognizing the differences in managerial efficiency in capital deployment can lead to misvaluations before M&As. 3 Leverty and Qian (2010) use different measures of efficiency and find that the market reacts more favorably to deals made by more efficient acquirers. By contrast, we link our simple measure of preacquisition investment efficiency to the postacquisition long-term stock and operating performance of the acquiring firms.
Section 2 of the paper describes our hypotheses and the empirical methodologies. Section 3 presents the empirical results on the association between the net return on investment and the postacquisition performance of merged firms. Finally, Section 4 presents concluding remarks. The appendix provides explanations of the variables used in the empirical tests.
Hypothesis Development and Empirical Methodologies
We first develop three specific hypotheses to examine different aspects of our main premise-managerial efficiency in capital deployment persists through M&As. We then define the measure of investment efficiency for acquiring firms and the empirical procedure in examining the relationship between the premerger net returns to investment and postacquisition performance.
Hypotheses
If our main hypothesis holds, in that acquiring firms that have generated higher net returns from investment continue to deliver superior returns in the M&A deals, then the net return on investment, constructed before the M&A deal announcement date, should predict the firm's postacquisition operating and stock performance. This is our first hypothesis. We examine both Downloaded from informs.org by [202.120.17 .110] on 27 June 2017, at 18:15 . For personal use only, all rights reserved.
3 the announcement period and the long-run postacquisition abnormal returns of the merged firms; we also examine merged firms' operating performance. On the other hand, if investors and the market begin to apprehend or fully recognize acquirers' investment efficiency before the announcement of M&A deals, then the predictability of the preacquisition investment measure on postacquisition performance would weaken or disappear.
Second, we examine whether the M&A deal itself affects postacquisition performance by comparing acquirers with matching nonacquirers as well as failed deals. More specifically, we hypothesize that the group of high efficiency (low efficiency) acquirers outperforms (underperforms) matching nonacquirers and firms that fail to complete the M&A deal. This set of tests can reveal whether a large M&A deal can magnify investment efficiency or deficiency in capital deployment. They can also help us rule out the alternative hypothesis that the link between preacquisition investment efficiency and postacquisition performance is driven by the persistence of certain firm characteristics.
Third, we postulate that investment efficiency relates to the quality of the acquirer's management. Since the CEO is the most important member of the management team, we study the effects of CEO turnover on the link between preacquisition investment efficiency and postacquisition performance. Under the null hypothesis-the CEO does not affect the firm's investment efficiency-the link would not change upon the departure of the CEO. By contrast, if the CEO participates in the investment decision process and is responsible for the implementation of new projects including M&A transactions, the link ought to be weakened if the CEO leaves the acquiring firm following M&A deal completion. These tests can also lend further support to our main hypothesis that it is the managerial effectiveness in capital deployment that persists through M&As.
Measure of Investment Efficiency
Our goal is to construct a measure that captures managerial efficiency in utilizing all the capital raised by the acquiring firm before launching large-scale acquisitions. Accordingly, we define our efficiency measure as the ROIC in excess of WACC. The return in ROIC is net operating profits (NOPAT) , or net income adding back after-tax interest expenses. Invested capital (Compustat item ICAPT) is defined as the sum of long-term debt, minority interests, preferred equity, and common equity. ROIC is then calculated as NOPAT scaled by lagged invested capital. Instead of using forecasted future cash flows net of initial investment costs (e.g., in the case of calculating project net present values (NPVs)), we use realized earnings net of WACC; this approach can avoid the (possible) biases in forecasts of earnings and cash flows and is therefore more reliable.
WACC is derived using the following procedure:
(1) Following French (1992, 1997) , among others, we use a portfolio approach to find individual stock betas-that is, the beta of each stock is the associated Fama-French 48-industry portfolio beta; 4 we then calculate the cost of equity using the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) (the market risk premium used in the CAPM is the average premium over the risk-free rate for the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) value-weighted index over the preceding 30 years). (2) We infer the after-tax cost of debt from interest expenses, total interest-bearing debt, and the marginal tax rate. 5 (3) We use the market value of equity and book value of total debt as weights in the WACC formula. 6 For robustness, we also use the unlevered (industry) cost of equity as individual firm's cost of equity estimates. Finally, net investment return is calculated as ROIC minus WACC. 7
Performance Measures of Merged Firms
We follow the CAPM to estimate abnormal announcement period returns:
where R it is firm i's return on date t, R mt is the market return on date t, R f t is the risk-free rate, and β it is estimated based on returns from past 60 months using the CAPM. We calculate cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) by summing the abnormal daily returns over a three-day event window around the M&A deal announcement date.
To measure the long-run stock performance of merged firms, we follow the literature on long-run event studies and use the "buy-and-hold" returns of a sample firm less the buy-and-hold return of a properly chosen benchmark portfolio. 8 The BHAR is calculated as
where R it is the month t return for firm i, R pT is the benchmark portfolio return, and T is the time horizon over which returns are calculated. We use the characteristic-based portfolio constructed in Wermers (2003; hereafter DGTW) as our benchmark portfolio. 9 The DGTW benchmark portfolio for a given stock during a given month is constructed to directly match that stock's three main characteristics: size, (industry-adjusted) marketto-book (MTB) ratio, and past momentum. Therefore, DGTW form benchmarks that directly match the characteristics of the stocks being evaluated.
In constructing the ex ante efficiency measure of capital usage, we use NOPAT scaled by lagged invested capital minus WACC as the net return on invested capital. Since NOPAT is defined as earnings adding back Downloaded from informs.org by [202.120.17 .110] on 27 June 2017, at 18:15 . For personal use only, all rights reserved.
after tax interest expenses, it is not affected by the methods of payment in acquisitions. Hence, NOPATscaled lagged assets (ROA) is our measure for operating performance in the postacquisition period. In our regression analysis, we exclude the period between the M&A deal announcement and the completion date from the postacquisition period to account for the differences in the timing of consolidating targets under the purchase or pooling method (Healy et al. 1992) . We also include an indicator for the pooling method and another indicator that equals 1 if more than 50% of the consideration for acquisition is paid for with the acquirer's stock.
Framework for Analyzing Postmerger
Performance To examine our first hypothesis, the link between the ex ante efficiency measure and the ex post performance of the merged firms, we run multivariate regressions to control for factors that may affect a firm's performance. Specifically, we estimate the following model:
Announcement Return (or BHAR or Postmerger ROA) β 1 Invest_Return + Firm and deal controls + Fixed effects + ε.
(1)
In Equation (1), the dependent variable is the announcement return (AR)-three-day CARs, or the one-, two-, and three-year postacquisition BHARs or ROA of the postmerger acquiring firm. Invest_Return, our main variable of interest, is each acquiring firm's ex ante efficiency measure of capital deployment obtained at the fiscal year end prior to the deal announcement; following our discussion, we expect β 1 to be positive.
Firm controls are the variables that have been shown to affect the performance of the postmerger firm. These include the acquiring firm's MTB, calculated one quarter before the M&A announcement date; preannouncement cash levels (Acquirer Cash); Accruals; and net operating assets (NOA), which is the balance sheet representation of the cumulative accruals; and PreAn-nReturn, the mean preannouncement return of acquirers from 200 days to 31 days prior to the deal announcement date, to account for possible short-run price momentum. We also include a Small Acquirer indicator, defined as an acquiring firm with its market capitalization below the 25th percentile of NYSE firms as of the fiscal year-end immediately before the M&A announcement date.
For M&A deal characteristics, we first include Relative Size, defined as the transaction value divided by the acquirer's market capitalization at the end of the fiscal year immediately before the deal announcement date, as a factor that may affect the acquirer's postacquisition performance. 10 We also include three indicators as controls: (1) Diversify equals 1 if the target and acquirer have different two-digit SIC codes and 0 otherwise, (2) Pooling equals 1 if the acquirer uses the pooling method, and (3) Tender is equal to 1 if the acquisition is a tender offer and 0 otherwise. As discussed earlier, we include an indicator (Stock) that equals 1 if more than 50% of the deal is paid for with the acquirer's stock. Finally, we denote privately owned target firms by the indicator Private Target and acquiring firms making multiple acquisitions (during the sample period) by the indicator Serial.
For fixed effects in Equation (1), we include a set of industry indicators. In addition, as recommended by Petersen (2009) , we include year indicators and cluster standard errors by year to control for the crosscorrelation among acquiring firms each year.
To examine our second hypothesis, we match each acquirer in the sample with a nonacquirer based on industry, size, and investment efficiency before the announcement of the M&A deal. Specifically, for each acquirer during the period of M&A deal announcement to completion, we identify all firms with the same two-digit SIC code and total assets between 50% and 200% of that of the sample firm (and obtain information during the same period). Those firms that were involved in a merger bid during the three years before the M&A deal announcement or the three years after deal completion are excluded. We then select the firm with its investment efficiency closest to that of the acquiring firm as the matching nonacquirer. As we separately examine high and low efficiency acquirers and compare them with their matching groups, we split the acquirers and matching nonacquirers into three groups: high investment efficiency group (net investment returns in the top 20th percentile of all firms), low investment efficiency group (net investment returns in the bottom 20th percentile), and medium group (the rest of the firms in the middle of the distribution).
For the comparison between completed and failed deals, we adopt a procedure following Savor and Lu (2009) : (1) for each completed or failed deal, we identify up to 10 matching nonacquirers using a procedure similar to the one described in the paragraph above;
(2) the abnormal buy-and-hold return of each acquirer equals the difference between its own buy-and-hold return and that of the return of the matching portfolio of nonacquirers; and (3) we split the completed and failed deals into stock-and cash-financed groups. Finally, within each of the two groups, we further split firms into high, low, and medium investment efficiency firms.
To examine the third hypothesis, we introduce CEO turnover into our baseline model: (2)
In Equation (2), we first ensure that the same CEO was in place starting from one fiscal year before the announcement of the M&A deal and continued as the CEO of the firm until the completion of the deal. We then study whether the link between preacquisition investment efficiency and postacquisition performance is affected by the departure of the CEO after deal completion-either during the first fiscal year (CEO_TurnoverYr1) or second fiscal year (CEO_TurnoverYr2) after deal completion. If this relationship weakens or disappears-as shown by negative interaction terms (β 4 , β 5 < 0) in Equation (2)-this would corroborate the hypothesis that our investment return measure captures managerial effectiveness, of which the CEO is a significant part. Since the information on CEO turnover is missing for some acquiring firms, we include a separate indicator for missing CEO information.
For corporate governance measures, we include (1) the E-index (Bebchuk et al. 2009 ), (2) the fraction of the board of directors who are outside members, (3) the fraction of insider ownership, and (4) whether the CEO is the chairman of the board. We also include CEO age and tenure as controls. 11 The inclusion of these variables is based on the hypothesis that managerial effectiveness depends on strong governance, including monitoring by the board. For each of these variables we also include a separate indicator for missing information.
Data and Empirical Results
From the Securities Data Company (SDC) U.S. M&A database, we identify all completed acquisitions, including the acquisitions of privately owned targets announced during the period of 1980-2013, and apply standard sample selection criteria. As is common practice, we exclude financial institutions and regulated utility firms. 12 In addition, if an acquirer announces multiple M&A deals in the same year, we only keep the first (qualified) deal made in the year. 13 Finally, we only include deals in which sufficient Compustat and CRSP data are available to calculate the variables as shown in Table 1 . This procedure yields a sample of more than 3,500 M&A deals, for which we analyze the ex ante efficiency measure in capital usage and ex post operating performance and abnormal stock returns. 14 Panel A of Table 1 reports the summary statistics of abnormal returns of the acquiring firms during the announcement and postacquisition periods, as well as their ROA during the first three years after deal completion. These are the dependent variables in our empirical tests. Both the mean and median values of the acquirers' postacquisition period abnormal returns are negative. Panel B reports summary statistics of the acquirers, and panel C reports deal characteristics. The average preacquisition net return on investment (Invest_Return) is 2.5% (median is 3.8%), and the standard deviation of this variable is 11.3%. More than onequarter of the acquirers have net returns less than 0, suggesting that they invest in negative NPV projects before launching the acquisition. The average MTB ratio of acquirers is 3.45; consistent with prior literature, the average level of Accruals is negative (−0.03), while the average acquirer holds about 21% cash over total assets.
Panel C shows that about 12% of the deals are tender offers, while 48% of the deals are paid for with more than 50% of the acquirer's stock. About 16% of the deals use the pooling method to account for the acquisitions (note that Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 141 requires all firms to use the purchase method for acquisitions initiated after June 30, 2001). Forty-two percent of the deals involve acquiring a privately owned target, and these targets are much smaller than public targets on average (the transaction value involving private targets is about one-tenth of that for public targets). Sixty-eight percent of the acquirers make more than one acquisition over the sample period ("serial" acquirers). Overall, the summary statistics (see Table 1 ) are similar to those in more recent M&A studies (e.g., Bouwman et al. 2009 , Oler 2008 , Netter et al. 2011 .
In the rest of this section, we present results from multivariate regression analyses on the announcement period (event) returns, postacquisition long-run abnormal stock returns and operating performance, and a number of additional results and robustness checks.
Announcement Period Returns and
Postacquisition Performance The dependent variable in column (1) of Table 2 is the three-day CAR of the acquiring firms. After controlling for acquiring firm and M&A deal characteristics, we do not find a significant relationship between the net returns on investment and the acquirer's announcement period return. This result suggests that, at the announcement of the M&A deal, the market does not distinguish acquirers with different levels of investment efficiency. We also obtain a number of other results consistent with prior research. For example, the market responds negatively to stock acquisitions (e.g., Servaes 1991, Rau and Vermaelen 1998) , while the announcement period return is higher if the acquirer experiences larger preannouncement stock returns (e.g., Jegadeesh and Titman 1993) . We also find that the announcement returns decrease in the level Downloaded from informs.org by [202.120.17 .110] on 27 June 2017, at 18:15 . For personal use only, all rights reserved. (1999), who interprets this result as the market taking cash-rich acquirers to have more severe agency problems, as indicated by Gao et al. (2013) . Finally, the market reacts positively to the acquisition of a privately owned target (e.g., Chang 1998 , Netter et al. 2011 ). The next three columns of Table 2 report the regression results for the BHARs, adjusted by the DGTW benchmark return, calculated over the one-year, twoyear, and three-year horizons after acquisition. We find that high investment return acquirers have significantly better postacquisition returns than low return acquirers over all three windows after the deal completion date; all the results are statistically significant at the 5% or 1% level. The magnitude of the results is also large: for instance, when the investment return increases by one standard deviation (11%), the threeyear buy-and-hold abnormal return increases by 10% ( 0.907 × 0.11, column (4); the mean three-year abnormal return for the sample is −5.9%). These results suggest that the preacquisition net return on investment is a strong predictor of long-run postacquisition stock performance.
The acquirer's NOA and accruals prior to the acquisition announcement date are both negatively associated with long-run abnormal returns during the postacquisition period (coefficient on NOA significant at the 5% level over the one-and two-year horizons), consistent with prior literature (e.g., Louis 2004 , Richardson et al. 2005 . The long-run abnormal returns are lower for acquirers with greater preannouncement price runups (statistically significant in the one-and two-year windows) and for stock acquisitions (significant in the three-year window), also consistent with prior studies. We also find that serial acquirers perform better, perhaps because of their experience in the earlier deals. Table 3 reports results for operating performance (ROA) of acquiring firms in the first fiscal year after deal completion (column (1)), the average ROA during the first and second fiscal years after acquisition (column (2)), and the average ROA during the first three fiscal years after the acquisitions (column (3)). As in the Downloaded from informs.org by [202.120.17 .110] on 27 June 2017, at 18:15 . For personal use only, all rights reserved. long-run stock return regressions (see Table 2 ), postacquisition operating performance is significantly better for acquirers with higher preacquisition net investment returns; all results are statistically significant at the 1% level (columns (1)- (3)). When the preacquisition investment return increases by one standard deviation (11%), the acquirer's ROA during the first year after deal completion rises by 4.4% ( 0.403 × 0.11, column (1)), and its average ROA during the first three years after deal completion rises by 3% ( 0.273 × 0.11, column (3)). Given that the mean ROA of merged firms is 6.9% during the first year and 7.4% (per year) during the three years after deal completion, the positive associa-tion between premerger net returns on investment and postacquisition ROA is also economically significant. We also find that operating performance is worse if the acquirer has higher levels of accruals, or NOAs or (preannouncement) cash holdings; uses stock as the main method of payment; or acquires a privately owned target. The relationship between cash level and long-run postacquisition operating performance is consistent with the findings of Oler (2008) . 15 Operating performance is better if the acquirer makes multiple acquisitions, has higher preacquisition MTB, or uses the pooling method. As additional controls, we include matching (nonacquiring) firms' operating performance Downloaded from informs.org by [202.120.17 .110] on 27 June 2017, at 18:15 . For personal use only, all rights reserved. during the postacquisition period to ensure that the results are not driven by the (possible) mean reversion properties of operating performance (e.g., Nissim and Penman 2001) . 16 The ROA of matching firms is positively and significantly related to the acquirers' postacquisition ROA, illustrating the success of the matching procedure.
In summary, results from Tables 2 and 3 show that the ex ante investment efficiency measure strongly predicts the postacquisition stock and operating performance of acquiring firms. Combining the announcement period results with the long-run abnormal returns results (see Table 2 ), we conclude that the market, triggered by an M&A deal announcement, does not recognize high investment return acquirers' greater efficiency in capital deployment, as these acquirers outperform the low net return acquirers during the three years after the acquisition. Overall, these results provide support for our first hypothesis.
The Effects of the M&A Deal and CEO Turnover on Postacquisition Performance
Results from the previous section establish a positive link between preacquisition investment efficiency and postacquisition performance for the acquiring firms. An alternative hypothesis stipulates that the positive link found in Tables 2 and 3 can be explained by the persistence of certain (observable or unobservable) firm characteristics, such as profitability. To rule out the alternative hypothesis, we examine the effects of the M&A deals on the postacquisition performance for acquirers with different levels of investment efficiency. Table 4 presents results from comparing acquirers and matching nonacquirers. By construction, the nonacquirers are similar to the acquirers in terms of size, industry, and investment efficiency (before the M&A deal announcement) but have not engaged in any M&A transaction three years before the announcement date and three years after the completion date of the acquirer's deal. It is clear that the group of low efficiency acquirers performs substantially worse than the group of matching nonacquirers in both BHAR and ROA. The magnitude of the differences in both BHARs and ROA is large, and the differences across all postacquisition periods are statistically significant. For example, during the first year after deal completion, low efficiency acquirers underperform matching nonacquirers by 20.5% in terms of BHARs and 2.56% in ROA (panels A and B; both of these differences are significant at 1%). These results suggest that completing a large M&A deal can exacerbate the deficiency in managerial effectiveness in capital deployment, and they support our second hypothesis. The group of high efficiency acquirers performs better than that of the nonacquirers in terms of BHAR during the first-year after acquisition, but not in subsequent years. There is no significant difference in ROA between the two groups.
In addition, we conducted tests comparing completed and failed deals (results available in the online appendix) following Savor and Lu (2009) . These results are similar to those reported in Table 4 . For example, among stock-financed deals, the group of low efficiency acquirers underperforms matching firms that Downloaded from informs.org by [202.120.17 .110] on 27 June 2017, at 18:15 . For personal use only, all rights reserved. Notes. This table reports the comparison of one-, two-, and three-year postacquisition BHARs (panel A) and ROA (panel B) for acquirers and matching nonacquirers. We match each acquirer with a nonacquirer based on industry, size, and investment efficiency before the announcement of the M&A deal. For each acquirer during the period of M&A deal announcement to completion, we identify all firms with the same two-digit SIC code and total assets between 50% and 200% of that of the sample firm (and obtain information during the same period). Those firms that were involved in a merger bid during the three years before the M&A deal announcement or the three years after deal completion are excluded. We then select the firm with its investment efficiency closest to that of the acquiring firm as the matching nonacquirer. We separately examine high and low efficiency acquirers and compare them to their matching groups. High (low) investment efficiency groups are identified using the top (bottom) quintile of all acquirers' investment efficiency estimated at the fiscal year-end prior to acquisition announcement. * , * * , and * * * indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
do not complete their M&A deals in all three years in terms of BHARs; statistical significance is weaker perhaps because of the small sample on failed deals. The group of high efficiency acquirers outperforms matching acquirers that do not complete their deals in the two-and three-year windows in terms of BHARs (with marginal statistical significance). 17 To summarize, on the basis of the comparisons with matching nonacquirers and failed deals, we conclude that the M&A deal does affect postacquisition performance as stated in our second hypothesis. The results also reject the notion that the predictability of investment efficiency is driven by the persistence of certain characteristics of the acquiring firm. Next, in examining our third hypothesis (and Equation (2)), we add two sets of variables, CEO turnovers and corporate governance measures, to see whether the CEO is an important factor of managerial effectiveness in capital deployment. Results on the buy-and-hold stock returns (operating performance) are reported in panel A (panel B) of Table 5 . In these models, we ensure that the same CEO is in place for the acquiring firm between one fiscal year before the deal announcement date and the deal completion year. Sample size is smaller as a result of the data requirements on CEOs. Column (1) in panel A repeats the analysis as shown in column (4), Table 2 , on the three-year buy-and-hold returns (on a smaller sample). We continue to find a positive and significant relationship between acquirers' net investment returns and postacquisition stock returns (with the magnitude of the coefficient greater than that in column (4) of Table 2 ).
In column (2) of panel A, we add CEO turnover indicators (during the first and second fiscal year after deal completion) and their interactions with the preacquisition investment return. We include a separate indicator for missing CEO turnover information. In column (3), we add the governance variables (again, we include a separate indicator for missing information on each of the variables). In both columns, we find that acquirers' stock performance is worse when there is CEO turnover after deal completion. Since CEO turnover following the completion of an M&A deal is probably not exogenous, this result can be explained by the fact that CEO turnover occurs following poor performance of the acquiring firm.
The focus of the test is on the interaction term between (demeaned) investment return and the indicator on CEO turnover: if the CEO is not part of acquirer effectiveness in capital deployment, then the link between preacquisition investment efficiency and postacquisition performance should not change when there is CEO turnover. In other words, the coefficient on the interaction term ought to be 0 regardless of the outcome of the possibly endogenous turnover (in terms of the quality of the new CEO relative to that of the outgoing CEO). We find that the interaction terms are negative in both columns (2) and (3) and are statistically Downloaded from informs.org by [202.120.17 .110] on 27 June 2017, at 18:15 . For personal use only, all rights reserved. significant at the 10% level. Moreover, F-tests show that the CEO turnover indicators and their interaction terms with investment returns are jointly significant at the 1% level in both columns. We obtain very similar results in panel B: (1) CEO turnover has a negative impact on postacquisition operating performance of the merged firm, (2) the interaction terms between CEO turnover and preacquisition investment returns are negative (statistically significant at the 10% level in both columns), and (3) F-tests for the joint significance of CEO turnover variables show that they are significant at the 5% level. The results from both panels therefore reject the notion that the CEO is not part of the managerial team that exhibits a certain degree of investment efficiency. The results support our third hypothesis that CEO is indeed a critical factor of the acquiring firms' investment efficiency. After controlling for CEO turnovers, the link between preacquisition investment return and postacquisition performance still exists (see the coefficients on Invest_Return in columns (2) and (3) in both panels), suggesting that there are other firm-level factors beyond CEO and the government measures included in the tests that affect investment efficiency.
Additional Results and Robustness Tests
In this subsection, we present and discuss results from a number of additional tests and robustness checks on the methodologies of calculating stock returns, Downloaded from informs.org by [202.120.17 .110] on 27 June 2017, at 18:15 . For personal use only, all rights reserved.
sampling periods, and different specifications of constructing the ex ante investment efficiency measure.
Calendar-Time Approach to Calculate Stock Re-
turns. The abnormal buy-and-hold returns in Table 2 , Table 4 , and panel A of Table 5 are based on an eventtime approach. That is, abnormal returns are calculated across M&A transactions for one-to three-year windows after the completion of these transactions, even though the acquisitions occur at different calendar times. One potential problem with this approach is that the significance of long-run returns can be overstated because of cross-correlations among returns (e.g., Bernard 1987 , Mitchell and Stafford 2000 , Kothari and Warner 2004 .
An alternative approach is to use calendar-time returns: tracking the performance of an event portfolio in calendar time. This approach weighs each month equally and tests a strategy of investing equal amounts in each month, and it is therefore immune to the potential cross-correlation problem. We track the performance of an event portfolio in calendar time relative to an asset pricing model. The event portfolio is formed each period to include acquiring firms that have completed the event (M&A deal) in the prior years (years 1, 2, or 3). In addition, we use the calendar-time approach to calculate the abnormal returns for the strategies of going short on low net investment return acquirers and going long on high net investment return acquirers.
For each month during our sample period, we create high and low net investment return event portfolios as follows: the high return (low return) portfolio consists of all the acquirers that completed an acquisition within the previous one, two, or three years. Portfolios are rebalanced monthly to drop all the acquirers that reach the end of their one-, two-, or three-year period and add all the acquirers that have just completed an M&A transaction. The portfolio excess returns are then regressed on the Fama-French (2015) five factors: the Fama-French (1993) three factors, the profitability factor (Hou et al. 2015) , and the Carhart (1997) momentum factor.
Formally, a pooled portfolio regression is estimated as follows:
where R p, t is the event portfolio return, (R m, t − R f , t ) is the excess market return over the risk-free rate, SMB is small minus big stock portfolio, HML is high MTB minus low MTB stock portfolio, RMW is the profitability factor, and MOM is the momentum factor. The intercept denotes the event portfolio excess returns. To estimate the difference between the returns of high and low investment return event portfolios, we create a dummy variable in the above equation, D low , which equals 1 if the event portfolio return is a low net investment return and 0 otherwise. The coefficient on the D low indicator, δ 1 , thus captures the difference between the low investment return portfolio and all the other stocks. Low investment return firms are identified using the bottom quintile of all acquirers' investment returns in the fiscal year-end prior to the deal announcement date. Table 6 , panel A presents the regression results for the event portfolios. The coefficients on D low are negative and statistically significant (at less than the 1% level in all three columns), reinforcing the notion that acquirers with low investment efficiency experience significantly lower long-run abnormal returns than acquirers with higher investment efficiency. Note that all four pricing factors are significant with expected signs, but adding them and interactions with the investment efficiency variable does not affect the main results. These results also help rule out the alternative hypothesis that the return predictability of the investment measure is driven by the persistence of certain firm characteristics (e.g., profitability).
In addition, we calculate mean abnormal monthly returns from long and short portfolios consisting of acquirers that completed acquisitions within the previous one-, two-, and three-year windows. Panel B shows that this strategy generates significant abnormal returns in all three years, with an abnormal return of 1.33% per month for the first year, which corresponds to an annual return of 16% ( 1.33% × 12), 0.58% per month for the first two years, and 0.33% per month for the first three years. Overall, the results using the calendar-time approach corroborate the results of using the event-portfolio approach in Table 2 and confirm that acquirers' ability to generate high net returns from invested capital prior to the M&A deal is an important predictor of postacquisition abnormal stock returns.
Robustness Checks.
We have shown in different tests with different dependent variables that the ex ante investment efficiency measure is an important predictor for acquirers' postacquisition performance. All the results presented so far are based on the entire sample period of 1980-2013. It has been documented that acquisitions tend to cluster in time (see, for example, Holmstrom and Kaplan 2001): for example, the number of deals is much greater in the late 1990s than in the 1980s. Moreover, Moeller et al. (2005) show that shareholders of acquiring firms experience much greater losses in the late 1990s than in earlier periods. To rule out the possibility that our findings are driven by the deals made in a particular period (e.g., the late 1990s), we split the sample period into three subperiods: acquisitions announced from 1980 to 1990, from 1991 to 2000, and from 2001 to 2013. Downloaded from informs.org by [202.120.17 .110] on 27 June 2017, at 18:15 . For personal use only, all rights reserved. (Invest_Return) from Tables 2  and 3 (the baseline models). We rerun stock return and operating performance regressions for each of the three subperiods and report the coefficients on the same variable in panels B, C, and D. It is clear that the main result on the positive relationship between the ex ante investment efficiency measure and ex post acquirer stock and operating performance is not driven by any particular sample period. In terms of the magnitude of the coefficients on investment efficiency in postacquisition BHAR regressions, it appears that the degree of "predictability" is the strongest in the 1980s, and then it falls over the next two decades. A weaker prediction suggests that firms and the market began to understand the ROIC measure over time-in the limit, if the market fully understands this measure in the pricing of acquirer stocks, then we would not observe a positive and significant coefficient on the investment returns in the BHAR regressions. So these patterns are consistent with the argument that as corporate governance improves over time, the predictability of the ex ante measure also weakens. Of course, a number of other factors could also affect the results-the nature of the merger waves in different decades, the characteristics of focused industries and firms, and so on.
Our investment measure is derived based on the difference between ROIC and the acquiring firm's WACC calculated prior to the M&A deal announcement. In panel E we use only ROIC as the measure and drop WACC. We can see that ROIC itself can predict postacquisition abnormal stock returns and operating performance (ROA). These results imply that the predictability of investment efficiency is tightly linked to the quality of the investment projects, and not just to the cost of capital needed to raise funds in order to finance the projects. Finally, we use an alternative method to calculate WACC (and that our measure is still ROIC − WACC). To reduce possible measurement errors resulting from effects of different levels of leverage of firms from the same industry, we use unlevered (industry) cost of equity as the input in the WACC formula. 18 Results using this approach, as shown in panel F, are quite similar to those reported in panel A.
Summary and Concluding Remarks
An extensive strand of literature documents misvaluations of acquiring firms' stocks at the time of M&As transactions, and it links the valuation of stocks to the characteristics of M&A deals and the performance of the acquirers. In this paper, we develop a new, simple measure on the acquiring firm's investment efficiency and link it to postmerger performance. Our measure is the return on invested capital-all the equity and debt capital-net of its cost of capital. Downloaded from informs.org by [202.120.17 .110] on 27 June 2017, at 18:15 . For personal use only, all rights reserved. Tables 2 and 3 . In the other panels, we vary either the sample period or the specification. All regressions include the same set of explanatory variables as those reported in Tables 2 and 3 . Robust t-statistics to heteroscedasticity are provided in parentheses. * , * * , and * * * indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
With more than 3,500 M&A deals announced during the 1980-2013 period, we find that acquirers with higher net returns on investment prior to the acquisition have significantly better operating performance and long-run abnormal stock returns after acquisition. The positive link between the ex ante investment efficiency and ex post performance indicates that managerial ability in deploying capital persists and that investors and the market do not fully recognize the differences in management's ability to deploy capital before the acquisition. After the completion of the M&A deal, low efficiency acquirers perform worse than matching nonacquirers in terms of both abnormal stock returns and ROA. These results imply that completing the large investment project exacerbates the problems in managerial deficiency for acquiring firms. Finally, when there is CEO turnover after deal completion, the link between preacquisition net return on investment and postacquisition performance is weakened. This result suggests that the acquirer's investment efficiency relates to the characteristics of the firm's management team, of which the CEO is an integral part.
Our paper contributes to the literature on market efficiency around corporate events by introducing a new measure of investment efficiency and by documenting a positive link between this ex ante measure and the ex post acquisition performance. Prior literature has shown that large-scale M&As can lead to substantial losses for acquiring firms' shareholders, despite "due diligence" efforts before completing the deals. We offer a new factor that the acquiring firm's shareholders and board of directors should considerthe firm's efficiency in utilizing capital leading up to the M&A transaction. In particular, if management has misallocated capital to negative NPV projects, shareholders should be cautious in approving the new M&A deal to avoid further losses. Our measure and similar methodologies can also be used to investigate management effectiveness surrounding other corporate events.
Appendix (Continued)

E-Index
The entrenchment index, constructed by Bebchuk et al. (2009) , measures the effectiveness of corporate governance. The index identifies six provisions that matter the most: staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, supermajority requirements for mergers, and supermajority requirements for charter amendments. The entrenchment index is constructed by counting the number of such provisions that apply to the company at the end of the fiscal year immediately prior to the acquisition announcement.
Indep_Board
The percentage of the independence directors on the acquirers' board at the end of the fiscal year immediately prior to the acquisition announcement.
Insider_Ownership
The percentage of shares owned by the insider of the company at the end of the fiscal year immediately prior to the acquisition announcement.
Missing Gov Indicator
An indicator variable equal to 1 if any of the governance variables is missing and 0 otherwise.
Abnormal Announcement Return
The CARs is the sum of abnormal daily returns over a three-day event window around the M&A deal announcement date. Abnormal daily return is calculated by deducting expected stock return estimated from CAPM from actual stock return. Beta used for CAPM is estimated from monthly stock return in the past 60 months before the announcement date, and a minimum of 24 months of nonmissing returns is required.
BHAR
The buy-and-hold returns of a sample firm less the buy-and-hold return of a properly chosen benchmark portfolio. We use the characteristic-based portfolio constructed in and Wermers (2003) as our benchmark portfolio. The DGTW benchmark portfolio for a given stock during a given month is constructed to directly match that stock's three main characteristics: size, (industry-adjusted) MTB ratio, and past momentum.
Endnotes 1 Shleifer and Vishny (2003) argue that overvalued (undervalued) acquirers are more likely to use stock (cash) to purchase targets' assets, and such stock-based (cash-based) acquisitions tend to underperform (outperform) the market in the long run. Empirical evidence has provided support for these arguments. 2 Prior literature (e.g., Tate 2005, 2008; Billett and Qian 2008; Benmelech and Frydman 2015) finds that the personal traits and experience of chief executive officers (CEOs) influence their investment decisions. 3 Edmans et al. (2012) and Baker et al. (2012) examine the effects of target valuation and prices on the likelihood of receiving an offer and the offer premium. In addition, using a sample of SEOs in the 1980s, Loughran and Ritter (1997) find that the operating performance of issuing firms peaks around the time of the offering but deteriorates afterward. 4 We assign each NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stock to an industry portfolio at the end of June of each year based on its four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code. We derive the industry portfolio beta by regressing value-weighted industry portfolio returns on the market returns over the past 60 months. The industry portfolio return is based on the lagged market capitalization of each stock in the portfolio (each stock must have at least 24 months of lagged returns available). 5 Following Nissim and Penman (2001) , the marginal tax rate is defined as the top statutory federal tax rate plus 2% average state tax rate. 6 In addition, we use the traditional approach to find individual stock beta, which is based on estimations using the past 60 monthly returns (with at least 24 months' returns available); with this approach, we winsorize the cost of equity estimates (based on betas and the CAPM) to lie in the range of 3%-30%. This approach yields similar results as those reported in our paper. See the online appendix for a summary of different methods to derive WACC.
7 Our approach is similar to the concept of residual earnings, which is the NPV of an investment project and includes a charge for capital employed against earnings (e.g., Feltham and Ohlson 1995, Penman 2003) . Leverty and Qian (2010) use "frontier efficiency analysis" with a firm's revenue as the output, and they use a number of inputs including physical and financial assets and the firm's cost structure to evaluate the efficiency of value creation by both acquirers and targets. 8 For acquiring firms that are delisted during the return period, the remaining return for the period is calculated by first applying CRSP's delisting return and then reinvesting any remaining proceeds in the size-matched portfolio (where size is measured as market capitalization at the start of the return accumulation period). For firms that are delisted for poor performance (CRSP delisting codes 500 and 520-584) and missing delisting returns, we follow Penman and Zhu (2014) and apply a delisting return of −100%; results are robust to using a delisting return of zero. 9 As shown in , among others, the "characteristics" of stocks (the DGTW portfolios) provide better ex ante forecasts of the cross-sectional patterns of future stock returns; characteristic matching also does a better job of matching future realized returns. Hence, this procedure should have more statistical power than factor-based models to detect abnormal performance (Wermers 2003) . The DGTW benchmarks are available at http://terpconnect.umd.edu/∼wermers/ftpsite/Dgtw/ coverpage.htm (last accessed June 7, 2017). 10 For controls related to the size of merging firms, we also use a continuous variable denoting acquirer size (instead of an indicator on small acquirers) plus relative size, as well as the size of the acquirer and target separately. Main results are robust to these alternative specifications. 11 Jenter and Lewellen (2015) find that M&A deals are more likely to succeed when the target CEO is closer to retirement age; this effect is weaker in better-governed firms. Jenter and Kanaan (2015) find that CEOs are more likely to be dismissed after poor industry and market performance.
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Management Science, Articles in Advance, pp. 1-17, © 2017 INFORMS 12 Our sample selection criteria include the following: the deal value must be at least $10 million (for both public and private targets), the acquiring firm must be publicly listed and traded on one of the major U.S. exchanges, and all partial acquisitions (i.e., acquiring less than 100% of the target assets) are to be excluded. With these screening criteria, we obtain about 11,000 completed deals from the SDC over the specified sample period. 13 In earlier versions of the paper, we chose the largest deal (made in a given year) for serial acquirers; this approach generated a somewhat different sample, but our main results are robust to this sampling procedure. 14 Specifically, requiring that each acquirer have nonmissing data on CRSP to calculate announcement returns reduces the sample from 11,000 to about 7,000 deals. If we also require nonmissing data on Compustat to calculate investment efficiency measures, we end up with about 3,500 deals. The screening and selection procedure and the resulting sample are consistent with those reported in Netter et al. (2011) . 15 See Almeida et al. (2011) for an alternative explanation. They argue that acquirers may pursue liquidity-driven mergers even if these deals do not have operational synergy. 16 Candidates for firms matching an acquirer are those with the same two-digit SIC codes and with asset size (at the end of fiscal year before the deal announcement date) that is 50%-200% of that of the acquirer; firms that have not made an acquisition during the three years prior to and three years after the deal announcement year are ranked based on their MTB, and the firm with the closest MTB is chosen as the matching firm. 17 Our results differ from those of Savor and Lu (2009) . They find that, as a group, completed deals perform worse than failed deals, whereas we differentiate acquirers by their investment efficiency and find different results compared with matching failed deals. Malmendier et al. (2016) examine failed deals and conclude that targets of cash deals are undervalued prior to receiving the takeover bid, whereas targets of stock deals are fairly valued. 18 To obtain unlevered (industry) cost of equity, we first obtain unlevered equity beta from a levered firm; see, for example, Chapter 19 of Brealey et al. (2011) for how to unlever a levered firm's beta. We then calculate each firm's cost of equity using the CAPM and then obtain the industry-level cost of equity and assign it as the input for the firm's cost of equity in the WACC formula.
